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HERMENEUTICS 
THERE IS AN apparent paradox in Michel Foucault's attitude toward henne-neutics. Although critical of its goal and method, he exemplifies at its best the qualities of a rigorous interpreter who tries to separate his own descrip-
tive discourse from the object he describes, whether in his powerful descriptions of 
some periods of Westem culture or in his painstaking interpretation of Hellenistic 
philosophy or little known treatises of the seventeenth century. The paradox is fur-
ther reinforced when Foucault engages in his last years in what he himself calls a 
"henneneutics of the subject." Nevertheless, Foucault's views on henneneutics can 
be organized along three perspectives: (I) in The Order of Things, hermeneutics is 
presented as a kind of discourse that can be dated in its arising and thereby relativ-
ized in any universal claim it can make; (2) in Archaeology of KnrtWiedge, henneneutics 
is mentioned as a method of investigation that archaeology criticizes and claims 
to overcome; and (3) in some of his last works henneneutics is co-opted as a new 
approach to the self, for example in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Let us therefore 
examine each of these three perspectives. 
In The Order of Things, Foucault uses the word "hermeneutics" in two different 
senses. He characterizes the age of the Renaissance as the age of henneneutics and 
describes the new discipline of henneneutics in the nineteenth century as a fonn of 
compensation to the treatment of language as an autonomous object. Regarding the 
Renaissance, Foucault argues that in the sixteenth century the prominent role played 
by similitude in order to make sense of the world was made possible by the combina-
tion of henneneutics and semiology. By henneneutics Foucault means "the totality 
of the leaming and skills that enable one to make the signs speak and to discover 
their meaning" (Ear, 29). These two aspects ofhenneneutics and semiology in fact 
represent what will become the discipline of hermeneutics in the nineteenth century. 
Without detailed descriptions, for example of its origin in Ast and Schleiennacher 
and further development with Dilthey, Foucault only mentions hermeneutics under 
182 
Hermeneutics / 183 
the name of "exegesis," as a discipline that arose when people like Raynouard, Bopp, 
or the Grimm brothers focused on the organic unity of specific natural languages 
and turned these languages into new "natural" objects of scientific investigations in 
philology or linguistics. The treaonent of language as a mere object of investigation 
caused what Foucault calls a compensation in the form of a "formalization," which 
started to find application in the human sciences; of a "literature," which became a 
particular use of language that resists theory; and of "exegesis." Exegesis or herme-
neutics experienced a renewal of interest owing to the fact that languages are not 
only organic unities but are also embedded in a tradition and have acquired in the 
course of time layers of social and cultural influences that can be "interpreted." 
In the second perspective we mentioned, that of The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
Foucault takes issue with the very method of hermeneutics rather than examining it 
as a historical discipline as he did earlier. By tracing the genealogy of hermeneutics 
in a diachronic perspective in The Order of Things, Foucault already contextualized 
the "rigor" and "principles" of the discipline and showed that the so-called disci-
pline of hermeneutics was rather an effect of the disappearance of discourse as it was 
prominent in the classical age. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault mounts a 
full-fledged attack on the hermeneutic method in order to present his own archaeol-
ogy. Hermeneutics anempts to go hack to the arising of meaning and to locate it as a 
psychological moment, even if unconscious, that is manifested by autonomous signs. 
In contrast, archaeology "refuses to be allegorical" (EAK, 1 39). Instead of being "an 
interpretive-discipline" that seeks "another, bener-hidden discourse" (ibid.), archae-
ology treats meaning as an event that can be described in its conditions of possibility 
irrespective of what speakers or agents intended or meant. Since signs are treated in 
their materiality, archaeology does not have to abide by the boundaries of works or 
the self-identity of inten tions. In its comparison between works of biology and works 
of philology without following what "authors" may have meant, archaeology renders 
irrelevant any effort to recover an author's meaning, to understand authors bener or 
differently than they understood themselves, as hermeneutics of Scheiermacher's or 
Gadamer's provenance typically does. Because archaeology deals with the material-
ity of sources and is commined to "the intrinsic description of monuments" (EAK, 
7), its description is "purged of all anthropologism" (EAK, 16). This also means that 
signs are bound to their historical conditions and do not exert their semiotic func-
tion across centuries. 
This focus on the material and historical conditions of knowledge allows the 
archaeological description to escape the tyranny of both the propositional level of 
thought and the ontological nature of things. Regarding the propositional level, 
Foucault argues that what he calls "statement" allows him to reach the level of 
what is an "event" that "neither the language [langue] nor the meaning can quite 
exhaust" (EAR, 28). The regularities that archaeology describes among statements 
or between statements and objects lead to "discursive formations" that generate, in 
-
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the mathematical sense of a matrix, intentions and meanings. Human beings them-
selves are shaped by these discursive fonnations and thus not in charge or in pos-
session of such formations. Regarding the ontological nature of things, archaeology 
brings to the fore a level of sense that escapes the level of things or, in Foucault's 
tenns, that can "dispense" with them (EAK, 47). Despite the apparent stability of 
things like metallic pins, the analysis of discursive fonnations can show that a pin 
manufactured in the classical age by a single worker in eighteen operations (EOT, 
224) and the apparently same pin later on manufactured on an industrial scale rely 
on two different discursive fonnations. Because they have different material and his-
torical conditions of possibility, they do not belong to the same "order" of things and 
thus, strictly speaking, are not the "same" thing. 
The claim that archaeology reaches a level that is below subjectivity and below 
things, as well as the hope to escape henneneutics, runs against the significant limi-
tations of the results archaeology can show. Although Foucault clearly does not want 
to describe what he calls "the spirit or science of a period," his "positivistic" anirude 
of description is compromised by the "henneneutic" decisions he made in choosing 
his own fields of investigation in The Order of Things. He himself wholeheartedly 
acknowledges that, had he chosen other fields, the results may have been different. 
He even accepts the objection he himself raises: "Could not pre-Lavoisier chemistry, 
or Euler's mathematics, or Vico's history have invalidated all the analyses to be found 
in The OrdN' of Things" (EAK, I58)? Foucault grants that his analyses are limited 
because he wanted to focus on "one region of interpositivity" (EAK, 159); for exam-
ple, showing that the classification of living entities in eighteenth-century narural 
history was made according to the same rules of representation as those enunciated 
by general grammar, so that natural history in fact used a grammar of classification 
analogous to general grammar. To require that his limited analysis be corroborated 
by other fields of investigation would be, he argues, to require that he describe a 
Weltanschauung, precisely what he rejects: "The horizon of archaeology, therefore, 
is not a science, a rationality, a mentality, a culture; it is a tangle of interpositivities 
whose limits and points of intersection cannot be fixed in a single operation" (EAK, 
159, Foucault's italics). The goal, Foucault says, is not to offer a unity of the objects 
of investigation but to celebrate their diversity by identifying several configurations. 
Therefore, he says that "Archaeological comparison does not have a unifying, but a 
diversifying, effect" (EAK, 160). 
If the results of archaeology are only valid for the fields chosen by the archaeo-
logical method and cannot be extended to other fields and thus cannot be submitted 
to the scrutiny of other disciplines, it seems that archaeology is ill named, for the 
way the investigation is presented in The Order of Things, at the very least, suggests a 
kind of rigorous historical investigation that can respond to objections and counter-
examples even if these come from fields other than those Foucault examined. If now, 
as Foucault acknowledges in The Archaeology of Knowledge, the results are only valid 
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for the fields investigated and no generalizations should be made to other fields, 
we in fact have to deal more with the genealogy of a discipline, like economy, biol-
ogy, or linguistics, than with a systematic study of regularities leading to discursive 
formations. Equally misused is the term "quasi-transcendentals," by which Foucault 
characterizes "Life, Labour, and Language" and uses as an alternative to "the tran-
scendental field of subjectivity" (Ear, 250). 
It may be this drastic limitation of the claims of archaeology th.at led to a change 
of focus in Foucault's works toward a genealogy - and with the paradox that gene-
alogy can better and more successfully accommodate the hermeneutic method that 
the archaeology rejected. Foucault uses the genealogical method on a variety of top-
ics, like the prison system and the techniques to shape and mold the individual, but 
came to find its unifying theme in what he calls the "care" or "practice of the se)f' 
and can be seen retrospectively as being already at work in the previous studies, 
although in an inverted form. To the outside structures and institutions rendering 
the self docile, there also corresponds a self that forms itself through these institu-
tions and through the experiences made possible by such institutions. "The care of 
the self" was the title of the third volume of the History of Sexuality, and the term 
"hermeneutics" was used in the title of one of Foucault's last courses at the College 
de France, "The Hermeneutics of the Subject." So, we come to the third perspective 
we outlined. 
The hermeneutics of the self is not an investigation of the essence of subjec-
tivity or a IilstOry of the subject in Western thought. Instead of an epistemological 
approach that would put Socrates' gnoti seauton in continuation with Descartes' cogito 
sum, Foucault's specific and idiosyncratic hermeneutics focuses on the experience 
of the self: the self sees itself, experiences itself, and forms itself. In such a view of 
the self as a practice, the world and others are part of an experience within which a 
self comes to form itself. Foucault's hermeneutics functions below the level of what 
could be a stable structure of the self, a substance or an essence of selfhood. The goal 
is not to "interpret" the self but to accompany its disclosure to itself, as it were, by 
following the experiences through which a self comes to understand itself or mani-
fest itself. This is more a "hermeneutic attitude" than a hermeneutic method, and it 
allows Foucault to revisit such notions as askesis or parresia in the Stoics in order to 
show that they are in fact "practices of the self." P01resia, for example, is an exercise 
in truth-telling or being true to oneself. This experience of the truth or this relation 
between subject and truth makes it clear that the self does not lie in anything that is 
stable or fixed under the level of experience but rather consists in a set of experiences 
and as such in a practice. 
The hermeneutics of the subject provides a method of investigation that deals 
with "objects" other than in archaeology in the sense that the experience of the 
self is different from the discursive formation at the basis of what we call "man." 
Besides disrupting the common views on the self that either the self only arose with 
186 / POL VAN DE VELDE 
modernity or that there is a continuity between Socrates and Descartes, Foucault's 
hermeneutics also tempers his own pronouncements in The Ord." ofThings that "man 
will return to that serene non-existence in which he was formerly maintained by the 
imperious unity of discourse" (EOT, 386). The notion of practice of the self thus not 
only offers an alternative to any traditional metaphysics of the self. It also mitigates 
Foucault's own views: his apocalyptical breaks between epistNnes taking place out-
side the experience of the self (in his archaeological period) as well as his focus on 
structures of power that subdue the subject outside its experience. In Foucault's later 
work, hermeneutics recovers its original humility of being an adjuvant to something 
that shows itself or somebody who attests to his or her own self. 
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